For all its daring, the revolt collapsed in months, and the reasons were structural rather than a failure of nerve. First, Phadke never won the mass base his strategy required. He imagined treasury raids seeding a general uprising, but scattered robberies in a few districts could not become a movement without wider support, and the educated, propertied nationalists he had hoped for stayed on the sidelines, wary of open rebellion. Second, the colonial state was far stronger and more mobile than a few hundred fighters living off the land. Once alarmed, the British poured resources into the hunt, posted a large cash bounty, and set two police forces โ British Indian and the Nizam's Hyderabad police โ onto his trail. Third, that bounty did its work: an informer's betrayal, not a lost battle, exposed his hiding place. Worn down after weeks on the run, Phadke was cornered and seized in July 1879. Finally, the very communities that had joined him were the most vulnerable to reprisal; the British could punish villages and choke off shelter far faster than Phadke could arm new recruits. The revolt failed not because its cause was weak, but because one determined man could not out-organise an empire.